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ABSTRACT
Images of the modern public administrator clash with yesteryear’s neutral public servants
obediently carrying out the orders of elected politicians. Partly influenced by the literature on
New Public Management, people often argue that public administrators today should
ensure quality services, give value for public funds, be responsive, operate strategically,
uphold organizations’ reputations, and the like. They thus seem to serve many masters, not
just politicians, but do the various masters’ interests harmonize or contradict? The research
question of this article is: Where do the loyalties of public administrators lie? The answer
involves all the potential objects of their loyalties: colleagues, the public good, moral
imperatives, the law, their organizations, the organizations’ clients, and elected officials. What
is the composition of loyalty for top public administrators? What are their conceptions of
loyalty? With the use of Q-methodology, we identify and describe four distinct types of
public administrators within the context of loyalty: (a) by-the-book professionals,
(b) society’s neutral servants, (c) the personally grounded, and (d) open and principled
independents. These conceptions matter because they indicate how administrators behave
and make decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written recently on the modern and professional public administrator
(Noordegraaf, Steen, and Frissen 2006) who enjoys much discretionary freedom (Meier
1993; Shumavon and Hibbeln 1986). Partly inﬂuenced by the literature on New Public
Management (NPM) (e.g., Maesschalck 2004) or New Public Service (e.g., Denhardt
and Denhardt 2000; Light 1999), it has been argued that public administrators should give
citizens value for money, deliver quality, be more responsive, operate strategically,
improve the reputation of their organizations, and so on (cf. Clarke and Newman 1997;
Noordegraaf 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000).
The images of the new public administrator clash with the classic images of the ‘‘old’’
one (e.g., Weber 1946): the public administrator who neutrally and obediently carries out
orders of elected politicians. Since Weber, many interesting studies have been done on the
separation between administration and politics (e.g., Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman
1981; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000; Peters 2001; Svara 1999); ‘‘One of the most important
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and enduring theoretical constructs in public administration is the politics-administration
dichotomy model’’ (Svara 1998, 51). In this literature, it becomes clear that public admin-
istrators today serve many masters, not just politicians. Do any of the interests of their
masters contradict each other? And if there are loyalty conﬂicts, whose interests are con-
sidered more important by administrators? As Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999, 172)
have noted: ‘‘Popular stereotypes and scholarly depictions do not provide a clear under-
standing of how public administrators perceive their roles and responsibilities or how they
use their considerable discretionary powers.’’
Among the various objects of loyalty—colleagues, the public good, administrators’
consciences, administrators’ organizations, the law, the organizations’ clients, and elected
ofﬁcials (Bovens 1998, chap. 9 and 12; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000; ’t Hart and Wille
2002; Nieuwenkamp 2001)—where do the loyalties of top public administrators lie? This
is our main research question and its answer is likely to be a mix of all possible loyalties.
This mix is also likely to lead to loyalty conﬂicts: what loyalty conﬂicts do top public
administrators experience?
Our results describe four conceptions of loyalty. Administrators’ conceptualizations
of their loyalties are morally important: they indicate how administrators behave and make
decisions (cf. de Graaf 2003, 2005a; Fletcher 1993). Furthermore, having different con-
ceptions means having different loyalty dilemmas and conﬂicts.
Before presenting the results of the Q-study, we describe conceptions of loyalty with
respect to existing literature.We then discuss the main concepts and theoretical background
of the study, followed by a description of Q-methodology and the research background.
Next we describe the empirical results and present the four loyalty conceptions of public
administrators. In the last section, we discuss the results of the study.
LITERATURE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS’ LOYALTIES AND ROLES
Questioning Weber’s Ideal Type
The classic public administrator as envisioned by Max Weber (e.g., 1946) is neutral and
predictable and has unquestioned obedience and loyalty to the elected political authorities
in order to serve the public good (Weber 1946). ‘‘According to Weber, administration
should be removed from politics and should serve as the neutral servants of their political
masters’’ (Fry and Nigro 1996, 37). In this view, the role of a politician is to give direction
to policies; the bureaucrat’s role is not to engage in political decision making but to execute
the orders of their political superiors (Fry and Nigro 1996). This image of the administrator,
dominant in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, has been questioned both normatively
and empirically. We can refer, for example, to the many important studies on the relation-
ship between administrators and politicians and the proper role of administrators in the
political process (e.g., Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Denhardt and Denhardt
2000; Peters 2001; Peters and Pierre 2001; Svara 1999, 2001). Because this study is
not on the administrative-political dichotomy but on loyalties and loyalty conﬂicts per-
ceived by administrators, rather than summarize this literature, we will only point out some
objections to Weber’s ideal type that explicitly deal with loyalty issues.
Public Choice is a clear example of a school with mainly empirical objections to
Weber’s ideal type. The school states that people in general—which of course includes
politicians and administrators—are motivated by self-interest. The loyalty of public
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administrators thus lies primarily with themselves and their own interests, not the public
good or elected ofﬁcials (Dunleavy 1991). The principal-agent theory is an outgrowth of the
assumption that all actors are self-interested; trying to align the interests of principals and
agents.
Other scholars have argued on empirical grounds that the image of Weber’s public
administrator is simply outdated. The ever-changing organizational context in America and
bureaucracies worldwide changes role perceptions and loyalties (Bovens 1998). The com-
plexity of societal problems, professionalism of public administratorship, media inﬂuence,
and citizens’ expectations of responsiveness from administrators (Rosenthal 1999), or
transformed constituencies and increased policy volatility (Durant 1991; Rourke 1991),
all play a role in the changing context. Denhardt (1988) has mentioned that public admin-
istrators have become more involved in making as opposed to merely executing policy; or,
as ’t Hart and Wille (2002) have phrased it, complementarity and teamwork among elected
ofﬁcials and administrators are important elements of modern discourse on the relationship
between politics and administration. O’Leary (2006), in her important study of Guerilla
Government, has discussed the reality of bureaucratic politics and pointed to three oft-cited
books on the policymaking inﬂuence of career public servants: Kaufman’s (1960) The For-
est Ranger, Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty, and Lipksy’s (1980) Street-Level
Bureaucracy. Clarke and Newman (1997) have argued that the expertise and education of
public administrators have risen and that some sense of professionalism has developed.
Professionalism implies a certain expertise and values which give direction to their actions.
Clarke and Newman (1997, 7) have called professional knowledge ‘‘the engine of social
progress and improvement which would enhance the ‘public good’.’’ Professionalism,
whatever its form, changes administrators’ perceptions of role, which in turn reshapes
loyalties.
Normative questions about public administrators with limitless obedience to superiors
and ofﬁcials (e.g., Eichmann’s bureaucracy) have also been raised in the literature (e.g.,
Arendt 1994; Bauman 1991) and in the more recent work on administrative evil by Adams
and Balfour (1998). Administrators, they have argued, should not be neutral cogs in the
wheel but inﬂuence the decisions they make based on their own conscience. It has been
argued that unquestioned loyalty to the established authorities, public administrators, and
police in World War II played a crucial role in heinous crimes. Responsibility and moral
agency, they have concluded, should not be exclusively placed in the organization as
a whole or at the top; an irreducible individual moral agency remains for every member.
Uncritical loyalty to ofﬁcials is dangerous and can lead to morally disastrous conduct.
In NPM literature, the strict loyalty of public administrators to elected ofﬁcials has
also been questioned normatively. Loyalties of public administrators should lie with values
like efﬁciency and effectiveness (cf. Clarke and Newman 1997; Denhardt and Denhardt
2000).
Role and Role Conceptions in the Literature
In the literature ‘‘loyalty’’ and ‘‘loyalty conceptions’’ are closely connected to ‘‘role,’’ ‘‘role
conceptions,’’ and ‘‘role obligations’’ (e.g., Bovens 1998; Cooper 1998; Petter 2005). An
‘‘administrative role’’ has been deﬁned by Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999, 175) as ‘‘a
cohesive set of job-related values and attitudes that provides the public administrator a sta-
ble set of expectations about his or her responsibilities.’’ Values play an important part in
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this deﬁnition, proving that loyalty concept and conﬂicts are also closely connected to the
value concept (de Graaf and van der Wal 2008). A study of public administrators’ loyalty
conﬂicts is therefore closely tied to the (mostly normative) public administration literature
on values, moral conﬂicts, and ethical dilemmas (e.g., Bowman andWilliams 1997; Cooper
1994; Frederickson 1993).
Roles and role perceptions of public administrators have been studied extensively.
Downs’s (1967) classic Inside Bureaucracy described ﬁve ideal types: climbers, con-
servers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen. Many others, like Long (1952) and Suleiman
(2003), have studied the role of public administrators and their use of discretionary powers.
O’Kelly and Dubnick (2005) have distinguished several models of bureaucratic behavior
on theoretical grounds and central to administrative ethics in the context of ‘‘dilemma-
facing situations’’: the intuitive, blameworthy, virtuous, reﬂexive, adaptive, just, rational,
strategic, and moralist bureaucrat. Empirical studies on the perception of responsibilities or
loyalties and empirical research on how public administrators self-reﬂect on exercising
their considerable discretion are rare, even though O’Kelly and Dubnick (2005, 393) have
stated that ‘‘the study of public administration in general should be aimed at analyzing how
public administrators make decisions in the face of dilemmas and in the context of the
structures bureaucracies provide.’’ Selden, Brewer, and Brudney (1999) have provided
an interesting empirical study using Q-methodology on how administrators perceive their
role and responsibilities and found ﬁve role perceptions: stewards of the public interest,
adapted realists, businesslike utilitarians, resigned custodians, and practical idealists.
No single study, to date, has focused directly on the loyalties of top public
administrators.
DEFINITION AND OBJECT OF LOYALTY
The Concept of Loyalty
Before we can answer anything about where the loyalties of public administrators lie, we
must clarify the concept of loyalty. Etymologically, the word traces back to the Latin
legalis, meaning law. Loyalty could then have been expressed by subjects being faithful
to legal objects and furthermore suggests a willingness to sacriﬁce. Serfs and lords come to
mind here. Our deﬁnition, however, applies to persons with various objects of loyalty: to
what or whom is a person loyal? Whether it involves sacriﬁce or the law is contextual.
Loyalty has normative, symbolic, and emotional connotations. Like integrity, there
cannot be too much of it. Graham and Keeley (1992, 191) have said: ‘‘Loyalty is very
popular. It has few opponents. Consider the alternative and the label it evokes: disloyalty,
treachery, betrayal, and treason.’’ Another similarity between integrity and loyalty is that
neither is often empirically studied, perhaps because making the concepts operational is
difﬁcult. And when the concepts are studied, their deﬁnitions vary. Loyalty has been de-
ﬁned as a desire to be and remain in the group (Ewin 1992, 419), an allegiance to a concept
outside the self (Hoffmann 2006, 2314), a disposition to accept rather than to criticize
(Birch 1975, 75), an emotional attachment and reaction to its object (Ewin 1993, 389),
a devotion to a cause (Royce 1908, 16), or being true to obligations (Vandekerckhove
and Commers 2004, 22).
In his classic Functions of the Executive, Barnard pointed to the importance of loyalty.
Barnard concluded that: ‘‘There are a number of words and phrases in common use with
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reference to organization that reach back to the factor individual willingness. ‘Loyalty,’
‘solidarity,’ ‘esprit de corps,’ ‘strength’ of organization, are the chief .... Thus ‘loyalty’
is regarded as not necessarily related to position, rank, fame, remuneration, or ability.
It is vaguely recognized as an essential condition of organization’’ (Barnard 1938, 84).
Most studies in organizational science that do study loyalty empirically have used
Hirschman’s (1970) theory and deﬁnition (e.g., Golden 1992, adding the dimension of
‘‘neglect’’; Lee and Whitford 2008, adding the dimension of ‘‘pay’’). In his Exit, Voice
and Loyalty, the object of loyalty is the organization, giving rise to the term ‘‘organizational
loyalty.’’ When we read in the literature, for example, that whistleblowing violates the
obligation to loyalty, it refers to this type of loyalty. Because we consider public admin-
istrators’ various objects of loyalty in our research, this particular construct of organiza-
tional loyalty is clearly inadequate.
As can be deducted from the different deﬁnitions, sometimes loyalty is described as an
attitude, sometimes behavior (Withey and Cooper 1992). It makes more sense to treat the
concept in this study as an attitude, a dedication—noting, however, that dedication always
inﬂuences behavior. In doing so, we do not specify loyalties as merely ideational: they
affect work and behavior in daily practices, mostly by prioritizing signals, issues, and meet-
ings (cf. Fletcher 1993). According to Jeurissen (1997), for example, loyalty is an attitude
aimed at an object, which involves a predisposition to act, is durable, and contains an
element of preference.
Pursuant to the above discussion, we will deﬁne loyalty as the willing and practical
dedication of a person to an object (cf. Stoker 2005, 273). Amidst all the ambiguities, we
agree with most organizational scholars that (1) the subject identiﬁes the object of loyalty
(the cause) and (2) the subject behaves in a way that promotes the interests of the object of
loyalty (Fletcher 1993).
Objects of Loyalties
What are the possible objects of loyalty for public administrators? Several attempts to an-
swer this have been made by administration scholars. Waldo (1988) has identiﬁed 12 sour-
ces and types of ethical obligations of public servants (a list that, in his opinion, could be
expanded indeﬁnitely). They include obligations to the Constitution; the law, nation, or
country; democracy; organizational-bureaucratic norms; profession and professionalism;
family and friends; the self; middle range collectives; the public interest; humanity;
and religion or God.
Bovens (1998) has analytically distinguished ﬁve conceptions of bureaucratic respon-
sibility. The object of loyalty changes in each (table 1).
Table 1
Five Conceptions of Administrative Responsibilities
Type Objects of Loyalty
Hierarchical Superiors and orders
Personal Conscience and personal ethics
Social Peers and social norms
Professional Profession and professional ethics
Civic Citizens and civic values
Taken from Bovens (1998, 149).
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About the hierarchical conception, Bovens writes: ‘‘One could call the idea that func-
tionaries owe their superior strict obedience, their organization complete loyalty, and the
outside world utmost discretion, the orthodox or classical conception of bureaucratic re-
sponsibility’’ (Bovens 1998, 149). Often the terms neutrality or impartiality are used for this
view of responsibility. Since democratic control of public organizations is important, so is
the idea of ‘‘primacy of politics,’’ the classical conception. Does loyalty of administrators
then lie simply with political leadership? No, it could not be this straightforward. Bovens
(1998, 155):
If control by democratic organs is the most important consideration, one would rather expect
the loyalty of the civil servant to lie ﬁrst and foremost with the (majority of the) popular
representatives and only secondary with the political leadership, and only after that with his
own ofﬁcial superiors and departmental organization.
Furthermore, as we saw earlier, the classical model leaves no room for individual
accountability.
To address this, Bovens distinguishes other conceptions of bureaucratic loyalty. In the
personal conception, the emphasis is on the beliefs and personal values of the administrator.
In the social conception, loyalty lies with colleagues, friends, clients, family, subordinates,
and acquaintances. In the professional conception, loyalty is driven by their profession and
professional rules. Bovens notes that the latter is on the rise and has the advantage of in-
troducing external moral considerations into the organization. It could thus assist in coun-
teracting phenomena like groupthink, peer pressure, and crimes of obedience. The ﬁfth and
ﬁnal conception is civic: loyalty to citizens. It allows disobedience to political leaders based
on appealing to general public interests, such as preserving the rule of law or preventing
large-scale waste of resources. The conceptions are ‘‘forces that work on an individual
functionary in the case of conﬂicts of loyalties. A strong centripetal force often emanates
from the hierarchical and social conceptions of loyalty.’’ (Bovens 1998, 165).
Based on an extensive literature study, Petter (2005) distinguished eight themes or
responsibility types connected to speciﬁc values: (1) moral responsibility (personal moral-
ity, public service, public interest), (2) professional responsibility (competence, expertise,
good practice), (3) hierarchical responsibility (compliance, oversight, productivity), (4)
ﬁscal responsibility (efﬁciency, economy), (5) legal responsibility (rule of law, constitu-
tional rights), (6) leadership responsibility (leadership, prudence), (7) consumer responsi-
bility (ﬂexibility, effectiveness), and (8) public responsibility (social equity, openness,
responsiveness). Each connects to a speciﬁc potential problem area.
Loyalty Conflicts and the Thick-Thin Distinction
As soon as multiple loyalties of public administrators are distinguished, loyalty conﬂicts are
unavoidable. Since each loyalty is closely tied to speciﬁc values, these conﬂicts can in part
be described as value conﬂicts or ethical dilemmas (Bowman and Williams 1997; Cooper
1994; Frederickson 1993; O’Kelly and Dubnick 2005). Most literature on how adminis-
trators deal with dilemmas in their public service roles has been more empirical in nature
than the literature on the exercise of discretionary powers in modern bureaucracies. Like
the empirical research of this article, it has focused on understanding the nature of admin-
istrators’ dilemmas. The world of administrators is seen as one of ‘‘multiple, diverse and
often conﬂicting expectations (Dubnick and Romzek 1993).’’ (O’Kelly and Dubnick 2005,
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395). O’Kelly and Dubnick (2005, 396) state that the ‘‘tick-thin distinction’’ (Williams
1985) runs to the heart of administrators’ dilemmas.
Thin moral reasons are universal, general moral principles, and applied without ref-
erence to speciﬁc contexts and situations, as in: ‘‘administrators should ﬁrst and foremost
be loyal to political electives.’’ Thickmoral reasons, on the other hand, are context-speciﬁc
reasons, a tractable morality (de Graaf 2003, 2005a).
The thick-thin distinction is similar to the distinction between the micro- and macro-
morality often used in corruption literature (de Graaf and Huberts 2008). Micro-morality
has to do with connections to people in our social circles (family, friends). Moral obliga-
tions in our personal lives are characterized by reciprocity: we help friends and family just
as we expect them to help us. Macro-morality, in contrast, emphasizes the universal. It is
the product of the process (described by Nelson 1949) of universalizing morality and claims
the legitimacy of its norms on institutions of the law, a universal system of formal norms.
Macro-morality is characterized by the complementarity of rights and duties as the primal
modus of social ties.
The thick-thin distinction will be used here to describe the origins of administrators’
loyalties. O’Kelly and Dubnick (2005, 398) have said:
The thick-thin distinction is very helpful in clarifying moral philosophy and thought, denoting
as it does dilemmas people face as they are torn between, on the one hand, allegiances to
communities and peers and, on the other hand, duties towards all humanity or toward ﬁxed
principles of action established, a priori, to any hard case that might emerge.
Given the close conceptual relationship between speciﬁc values and objects of loy-
alties, the distinction can be used to understand loyalty dilemmas and the justiﬁcations,
background, and evolution of loyalties.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: Q
Here we study and describe the loyalty conceptions and conﬂicts of Dutch top public
administrators. The context is relevant: Aberbach et al. (1981) already noticed ‘‘clear dif-
ferences between the United States and Europe on the degree of intertwinement between
political and administrative elites’’ (Lee and Raadschelders 2008, 423). The Dutch context
in brief is the Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state, with parliamentary sovereignty
and cabinet government. Only theMembers of Parliament are directly elected by the voters,
not the cabinet and its ministers. After parliamentary elections, a cabinet formation takes
place, resulting in a coalition. Almost all cabinet ministers head a department, which are
staffed by career public administrators (no party political appointments). ‘‘The idea of the
loyal, politically neutral civil servant recruited on the basis of Weberian ‘merits’ criteria is
an entrenched norm’’ (’t Hart andWille 2006, 126). Dutch politico-administrative relations
comply with the functional village model in Peters’s typology (Peters 1997): politicians and
administrators share a policy role along functional lines (Brans et al. 2006, 61). The Nether-
lands is often described as a consensual democracy (Lijphart 1999). For a good overview of
the Dutch administrative system, see Andeweg and Irwin (2005) or Toonen (1990); for
more on the speciﬁc relationship between ministers and top ofﬁcials in the Netherlands,
see ’t Hart and Wille (2006).
There are various ways to empirically study where the loyalties of public administra-
tors lie; here Q-methodology was deemedmost suitable because Q-study results are clusters
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that are functional rather than logical (de Graaf and van Exel 2009; van Exel, de Graaf, and
Brouwer 2006). In other words, the clusters are not logically constructed by the researcher,
they result from the empirical data; they are operant. Q-methodology can reveal a charac-
teristic independently of the distribution of that characteristic relative to other character-
istics in a population. Unlike surveys, which provide patterns of variables, Q-methodology
provides patterns of persons, in this case, administrators. Q-methodology is a mixed
qualitative-quantitative small-sample method that provides a scientiﬁc foundation for the
systematic study of subjectivity, such as people’s opinions, attitudes, preferences, and so
on (Brown 1980, 1993; Watts and Stenner 2005). Q-methodology has been linked to
Weber’s theory before (Brown 2000; Stephenson 1962). On the type of research question
of this article, Petter (2005, 211) has said:
For instance, do administrators who evaluate subordinates based on hierarchical
responsibility also emphasize other low-autonomy perspectives? Or do they balance it by also
stressing an outcome focus, such as public responsibility? AQ-methodology studymay reveal
patterns.
Q-methodology was applied to this study through four steps (discussed below):
selection of relevant statements (Q-set), selection of respondents (P-set), respondents’
ranking of statements (Q-sort), and interpretation of the results (Q-analysis).1
The Q-Set
In a Q-methodological study, people typically are presented with a sample of statements
about some topic (here, issues concerning the loyalties of public administrators), called the
Q-set. We compiled a list of all the quotes on loyalties, responsibilities, and role concep-
tions found in academic and popular literature. The original list contained more than 600
quotes. According to Brown (1980), it is best to use a structure for selection of a represen-
tative miniature of such a list. Whatever structure is used, it forces the investigator to select
statements widely different from one another in order to make the Q-set broadly represen-
tative (Brown 1980). Irrespective of the structure, it is the subject that eventually gives
meaning to the statements by sorting them (Brown 1993).2
A Q-set of 42 statements was chosen (see Appendix) by ﬁrst discarding overlapping
statements and second, applying the following schedule to the statements:
Table 2 is based on Bovens’s (1998) objects and Petter’s (2005) responsibilities of
administrators’ loyalties.3 We ensured that each theoretically relevant category was rep-
resented in the 42 statements in both the object and background of different loyalties. The
logic of the Q-set was not used to classify the respondents. As stated above, Q-study results
are functional rather than logical clusters; that is, the researcher does not logically construct
the clusters. They result from the empirical data; they are operant.
1 The main source for Q-methodology is Stephenson (1953). Within the social sciences, Brown (1980) is a classic.
2 The limited number of comparative studies that have been carried out indicate that different sets of statements
structured in different ways can nevertheless be expected to converge on the same conclusions (Thomas and Baas
1992–1993).
3 The models supplement each other and largely overlap. The ﬁrst four conceptions of Bovens overlap with the
hierarchical, moral, leadership, and professional loyalties of Petter. Bovens’s ﬁfth conception, civic responsibilities,
was speciﬁed in Petter’s societal, legal, and customer loyalties. Petter’s eighth responsibility, ﬁscal, is now seen as part
of the professional loyalty.
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The P-Set
The set of respondents is usually not randomly chosen but theoretically structured (Brown
1980), and all viewpoints should be included. All top-level Dutch public administrators are
automatically members of ABD (Algemene Bestuursdienst; the Directorate for the Senior
Public Service), the professional organization for top administrators. Since its foundation in
1995, public administrators ofﬁcially work for the ABD rather than a particular ministry.
Total ABDmembership is 857. At its highest level are 61 administrators spread throughout
15 ministries, 52 of which are men and 9 women.4 By letter, we requested all for interview.
We also invited 50 other ABD members from different ministries (Interior; Health, Well-
being and Sport; Defense and Foreign Affairs) to ensure variety. From this group, all 26
women were selected for gender leveling and 24 men (6 from each ministry) were selected
randomly. Of the total 111 invitees (76 men and 35 women), 38 agreed to interview.5,6
The Q-Sort
By Q-sorting, people give subjective meaning to the set of statements and so reveal their
subjective viewpoint. Stephenson7 has presented Q-methodology as an inversion of con-
ventional factor analysis, in the sense that it correlates persons instead of tests (i.e., by-
person factor analysis). If each individual had unique likes and dislikes, their Q-sorts would
not correlate. If, however, signiﬁcant clusters of correlations exist, they can be factorized,
described as common viewpoints, and individuals can be mapped to a particular factor.
Using a quasi-normal distribution, respondents were asked to rank-order the 42 state-
ments from their own point of view according to some preference, judgment, or feeling
(ﬁgure 1).8 The two statements he or she agreed with most were put on the right (for a score
of 13); the two he or she disagreed with most on the left (23). The statements they felt
Table 2
Logic of the Q-set
Thick Thin
Hierarchical loyalty
Personal loyalty
Social loyalty
Professional loyalty
Societal loyalty
Legal loyalty
Customer loyalty
Note: Adapted from Petter (2005) and Bovens (1998).
4 Based on Internet data of March 5, 2007, at http://www.algemenebestuursdienst.nl.
5 Discounting undeliverable invitations (many addresses were invalid), the response rate was a respectable 42%.
6 The interviews were held by drs. Angelique Hornstra and drs. G. J. de Graaf.
7 William Stephenson, the inventor of Q-methodology, served as the last assistant to Charles Spearman, the inventor
of conventional factor analysis (Brown 1997).
8 Even though a forced distribution was used, some deviations were tolerated. If the Q-sorters found the forced
distribution too much unlike their positions, they were allowed to slightly vary the number of statements they were
‘‘supposed to’’ have in a category.
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indifferent about (or did not understand) were put in the middle (the 0 category). The ﬁnal
distribution was the Q-sort. The Q-sorts were factor analyzed with the objective of reveal-
ing a limited number of corresponding viewpoints.
After the statement sorting, we held a second interview with each respondent to gain
insight into the reasoning behind their choices, for example, ‘‘Why did you put these two
statements in the13 category?’’ ‘‘Do you see an issue concerning loyalty that is missing in
the statements?’’ This helped with the ﬁnal analysis of the different factors.
Q-Analysis
The individual Q-sorts were factor analyzed using PQMethod 2.119 (extraction method:
centroid; rotation method: varimax) in order to reveal the distinct ways in which the state-
ments were rank ordered. The analysis led to four factors (or loyalty conceptions) A, B, C,
and D. For each factor, a composite sort was computed based on the rankings of the re-
spondents loading on that factor and their correlation coefﬁcient with the factor as weight.
This idealized Q-sort represents the way in which a person loading 100% on that factor
would have ranked the 42 statements (see Appendix).
Each factor was interpreted and described using the characterizing and distinguishing
statements and the explanations of respondents loading on the factor. A statement is char-
acterizing by its position in the outer columns of the idealized Q-sort of the factor and is
distinguishing if the position is statistically signiﬁcantly different from its position in the
idealized Q-sorts of all other factors. Respondents’ explanations (which were transcribed
literally during post-Q-sort interviews) are cited in italics to illustrate administrators’ way
of thinking and support the description of that viewpoint. Corresponding statement num-
bers from the Q-set are noted in parentheses.
RESULTS: THE FOUR LOYALTY TYPES
Even though all administrators subscribe to the notion that of being loyal to their ministers,
the loyalty is interpreted differently, resulting in different kinds of loyalty conﬂicts. Four
loyalty conceptions were elicited from the analysis and are presented below in the form of
a label and narrative (cf. de Graaf 2005b; van Exel, de Graaf, and Brouwer 2006).
Figure 1
Fixed Distribution of the Q-set
9 Dedicated software and manual can be downloaded from http://www.rz.unibw-muenchen.de/p41bsmk/qmethod.
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Factor A: By-the-Book Professionals
Public administrators of the by-the-book professional type of loyalty want foremost to serve
society and its citizens. They believe this can best be done by being loyal to their own
profession and professional rules. This is clearly not a loyalty to the stakeholders of their
own organization or colleagues. Their moral reasoning is generally thin.
Factor A administrators work for the government because they want to serve society
(#7): —That has always been my motivation. For me working in the private sector was
not an option. It is a sense of duty. —Being loyal to your minister is your task, but once
the minister harms the public interest, the loyalty stops. That means that they aim for the so-
cietal effectsof theirwork.Administratorswhoaremerely focusedon theirownoutputarenot
good public administrators (#22):—You have to be effective in society, not just effective for
your department. Administrators should be focused on improving things in society. You have
to worry about outcome; output is just focused on the short term, something to strive for
immediately.—Weare here for the citizen, ﬁrst and foremost. Administrative output is about
great policy business, which can be bad for society. You have to be loyal to the minister, but
thereareboundaries. ‘‘Being there for thecitizen’’ ismeant inabroad, abstract senseand thus
denotes a thin relationship, not an actual relationshipwith a citizen or stakeholder:—There is
toomuch talk about ‘being closer to the people’ and so on.My conviction is that people are at
a distance from us and that’s the way it should be. You have to defend what you do, be ac-
cessible and approachable, but the relationship should not be too close or too personal.
Public values are clearly held above administrators’ own political values (#13): —If
there’s tension between public values and my own political values, the public values pre-
vail. That does not mean that administrators should have a clear picture of the ‘‘good so-
ciety’’; elected politicians are responsible for that. However, blindly following the minister
is not something a professional should do (#34): —If the minister asks for something
inappropriate or irresponsible, I won’t do it.
Society can best be served by being a professional public administrator, which is not
about pride, status, or peer connectivity:—This is a professional institution in the service of
the government. —It’s all about quality. Colleagues sometimes have speciﬁc interests in
mind or speciﬁc assignments that are in their way. I don’t do that. Being professional also
means that an administrator should not misbehave in private life (#29): —Administrators
should set a good example in society for being impartial. That’s the only way to make sure
that people look up to you. In private life you also have to watch that, especially top ad-
ministrators. —As an administrator you can’t afford to let it all out on weekends. You
always have to behave decently. That’s part of being a public administrator.
Professionalism and professional rules are important (#32):—Professionalism and loy-
alty are the leading values in my job. I’m a professional. You have to be loyal to the rules of
your profession.—I’m not someone who just follows orders. My profession, knowledge, and
conscience determine the borders of my job. —Professionalism is the key word for public
administrators. You have to be loyal to the rules of your profession. —Professionalism is
important and that doesn’t just mean knowledge, it also means that you behave decently
and follow the rules of the game. Your behavior should be guided by the public interest.
Bending the rules to help societal stakeholders or speciﬁc citizens is unprofessional (#30)
and can even lead to conﬂict: —Rules form the playing ﬁeld. Only politics can change that.
I do not condone being ‘ﬂexible’ to ‘satisfy’ all our stakeholders. —Societal partners are
important, but a deal is a deal. If someone wants something different, the rules should
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be changed. —The smallest bit of arbitrariness or privilege-granting is wrong. It under-
mines the principles of our constitutional state. Rather than hindering effectiveness and
efﬁciency (#37), rules are a necessary part of any good and fair government. These admin-
istrators, however, are not neutral rule followers (#21) and a professional administrator is
not a slave to the rules. —I don’t just stamp pieces of paper!
Factor B: Society’s Neutral Servants
Like the professionals, neutral servants feel a strong loyalty to society in general and to
public values. They believe they can best serve society by being as neutral as possible; in
a democracy elected ofﬁcials should make the decisions. Of all types of top administrators,
they are most loyal to their ministers and have the fewest conﬂicts with them. Their loyalty
is not with their ‘‘profession’’; the profession and professional rules were not mentioned by
these respondents. Another difference from by-the-book professionals is that their own
opinions and convictions carry less weight in their work.
Neutral-servant administrators want to serve society (#7); they work with passion for
the government (#24): —My whole career has been in public service, a conscious choice.
—I ﬁnd pleasure in serving society in my regular and additional functions. My goal is to
help society through my job. They are focused on societal effects rather than bureaucratic
output (#22): —That’s my greatest horror and annoyance. I work for the central govern-
ment because I want to do something for society. There’s too much attention nowadays on
measuring output, but that’s not what it should be all about. It should be about whether
something actually happens. —Sometimes bureaucratic output is bad for society. We’re
here for the citizen. You have to be completely loyal to your minister. —Output is nice
to show quick results. But our work should be organized to achieve lasting societal effects.
Will the citizen be better off? That should be the leading question. Personal values should
not be above an individual’s own political values (#13). And it is not so much a personal
opinion of what is right that should guide administrators’ behavior: —Personal values are
important, but you should serve the public interest. When personal values play too big
a role, public trust in government is undermined. —That administrators should not base
their decisions on personal values is very important. It is the only way to maintain legal
security and equality before the law. —I ﬁnd administrators inﬂuenced by political parties’
considerations to be gravely in error. —The elected political should always have the last
word. —The minister has certain goals and it is my task to technically advise on how he can
best reach those goals.
Neutral servants clearly serve the public good in general; their loyalty is not with their
own organization or ministry (#35). They are also least rebellious when ministers ask them
something unlawful (#2): —The elected ofﬁcials are responsible, period. However, when
something is bad for citizens, I warn the minister more than once.
The major parting point from by-the-book professionals is that neutral servants ﬁnd
their own role less important and think that top civil servants do not have the right to opine
publicly about their occupations’ affairs (#5). Freedom of speech is inside the walls. You
have to be allowed to say anything to the minister. Outside you have to restrain yourself,
otherwise there is a loyalty problem. —Of course I feel that I should be able to talk to my
friends about public affairs. But once I speak as a top administrator, my personal opinion
does not count. —As an administrator it is not your decision. You present choices and the
elected ofﬁcials decide. —Never reveal outside that you disagree with something. In this
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respect, it is nonsense to claim that the disqualiﬁcation of public administrators’ opinions
cannot be tolerated (#39); again because it is all about being a good advisor, not about the
personal opinion of the administrator. ‘‘When you’re with three administrators at one table
and personal opinions are allowed, the minister gets three different pieces of advice; that
doesn’t work. There has to be one objective, qualiﬁed opinion. Only then is it administrative
advice. Quality is not in the word opinion; it suggests something personal.’’
Factor C: The Personally Grounded
The loyalty of these public administrators tends to lie with their private lives and their own
consciences. They often use thick moral arguments. They weigh work loyalties against
those dictated by other societal roles, sometimes leading to loyalty conﬂicts. They are crit-
ical of government and bureaucracy and dislike rules because they impede creativity.
Their private lives matter above all else, including their high-level jobs (#1): —The
business at work sometime creates tensions at home, like not giving attention to your wife
and children. But in the end I would always choose for my private life. My family comes
ﬁrst. —My private life is more important than my job because a job is just one facet of who I
am. My life has many components. They therefore are not twenty-four-hour civil servants
(#24): —I can’t imagine being that. When I come home I am a mother, wife, and all sorts of
other things. I have many roles and identities. Expecting me to behave as an administrator
outside the ofﬁce is absurd.
Loyalty to their identities and consciences is important (#34, 25): —On my policy
terrain, I am the expert. I look at an interest that goes above the minister. —Neither
as a human being nor as a professional can I do things that go against my conscience.
Sometimes balancing is necessary but too much balancing means there is something wrong
and it is time to leave. That makes the loyalty dilemma for our profession tough sometimes.
—I cannot do something if it will keep me awake at night. My identity is the most important.
Rules and regulations do not lead these administrators’ jobs; indeed, they have a no-
table dislike of them (#11): —They’re repugnant to the individual mind; they kill its cre-
ativity. Every day it seems there’s a new litany of rules. They’re not interesting and don’t
work. You have to follow most rules, but sometimes you have to apply a higher norm.
—What’s legal doesn’t interest me. Rules are made by people in power and often stem
from their own interests or the latest fads. As a society you have to have some rules,
but in the end I pursue a higher value. —Government is schizophrenic. It has an urge
to control everything just to make sure everything is executed correctly. I ﬁnd it important
to know the rules, but it cannot be that a ‘system-of-madness’ determines what I can and
cannot do . . . I see too many colleagues who strictly follow rules. It destroys their creativity.
Nor does the loyalty of this type of administrator lie with stakeholders in their policy
ﬁeld. Letting concerned parties know they disagree with policy is beyond the purview of
their jobs (#31): —If I think that a minister ought to do something else, it’s an internal
matter. —I keep matters internal. I would not tinker with external powers as a counter-
weight to a minister’s decision. For these administrators, elected politicians have the last
word: —The primacy is with the politician.
Factor D: Open and Principled Independents
The loyalty of independent public administrators lies clearly with their own principles, the
law, and ofﬁcial rules. They argue mainly in terms of thin guidelines and principles. They
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were averse to the statements that began with ‘‘I [think, feel, believe, etc.].’’ There is too
little room to express their own consciences, which in any case might lead to loyalty con-
ﬂicts. They believe that elected ofﬁcials should determine the general direction of policies
under the limits of the law and ofﬁcial rules. Loyalty conﬂicts also arise when ministers
want something disallowed by law or when expressing themselves in public.
Independent administrators will not quickly go against their conscience:—The goal of
my job is not just to do what management wants. It’s a mix of my own conscience, external
contacts, etc. —Doing something I can’t live with means I’m on the wrong path, I’m em-
bracing the wrong loyalty. In any mature democracy, top public administrators should be
allowed to say what they want in public; that’s simply freedom of speech (#5). This some-
time leads to loyalty conﬂicts; the role of the involved citizen may clash with the role of top
civil servant. —I feel that an administrator is part of society. He should therefore be al-
lowed to speak to outsiders. You don’t make policy behind your desk; you have to talk to
outsiders. —I feel we sometimes say too little in public. I do that sometimes, but am not
thanked for that. Of course, you can’t say that what the minister wants is bullocks, but you
should be able to publicly express concerns. Politicians determine in the end, but that
doesn’t mean I have to be silent about it.
Public administrators may decide for themselves what they believe the best option
is, which doesn’t mean they have the right to make the ﬁnal decision (#20). Politics decide,
not the civil service.Public administrators should not base their decisions on personal values;
in such cases, citizens could no longer trust that policies and rules are followed uniformly
(#41). —The core of our job is our workmanship; choices are part of that. But there are
professional boundaries to that. I do not make decisions about gay marriages or abortion.
If you want to determine that sort of decision, you are in the wrong trade.What follows from
that is that loyalty to the minister is important (#31), but it is not an absolute loyalty. These
administrators will not do something that is against the law, even if asked by the minister:
—That’s my civil responsibility. If the minister wants to do that, I won’t participate.
Loyalty does not lie above all at home (#1). Administrators should not complain about
the tensions and responsibilities that come with their positions: —Whatever’s important in
my job, I take home. If it takes a toll on my private life, so be it. It’s the sort of thing that
comes with the job.
COMPARING LOYALTY CONCEPTIONS OF TOP DUTCH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS TO
OTHER PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
The loyalty typesofSelden,Brewer, andBrudney (1999)—‘‘stewardsof thepublic interest,’’
‘‘adapted realists,’’ ‘‘businesslike utilitarians,’’ ‘‘resigned custodians,’’ and ‘‘practical
idealists’’—are different from those identiﬁed in our study. In particular, we found no busi-
nesslike utilitarians who could be described by statements like, ‘‘Efﬁciency is far more im-
portant tomethanbeingfairorsensitive. I feel thatbeingfair isanexcuseforacceptingalackof
competence anda loweringof standards’’ (Selden,Brewer, andBrudney1999,189). Possible
explanations are (1) the authors’ concept of role (and therefore their Q-set) was broader; (2)
their sample of public administrators differed from ours, which was restricted to top admin-
istrators; (3) contexts have signiﬁcantly changed over the past ten years; and/or (4) cultural
differences (theNetherlands versus theUnited States) affect conceptions of loyalty. This rai-
ses thequestionof the extent towhichDutch toppublic administrators’ conceptionsof loyalty
differ from other types of administrators and other nations’ top administrators.
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A similar study among topmunicipal administrators and street-level bureaucrats (to be
more precise: local license providers) in the Netherlands (de Graaf 2010; de Graaf and van
derWal forthcoming) found that top public administrators’ conceptions of loyalties seem to
be different from other groups of administrators. For example, and perhaps not surprisingly,
client loyalty seems to play a large role in the loyalty conceptions of street-level admin-
istrators, whereas loyalty to stakeholders in the policy ﬁeld (the equivalent of client loyalty
for top-level administrators) plays a small role in the loyalty conceptions of top adminis-
trators as described in the previous section; just like among the top municipal administra-
tors (the smallest of all distinguished objects of their loyalty; de Graaf 2010). Some types of
license providers express a strong loyalty to their clients, types that have been identiﬁed in
the literature (e.g., Lipsky 1980). In the case of street-level bureaucrats, therefore, dealing
with government clients on a daily basis has a signiﬁcant impact on loyalty and engenders
a type of loyalty not seen in top-level administrators.
‘‘Hierarchical loyalty’’ seems to be the most important object of loyalty for all three
groups of administrators. To this generalization, we immediately add that the hierarchical
loyalty is interpreted differently within each group (see, e.g., the Results section) as well as
between the groups and is contextually dependent. Furthermore, hierarchical loyalty is
clearly weakest in street-level bureaucrats relative to other groups; indeed, the hierarchical
loyalty of several types of municipal license providers is relatively weak. An explanation
for this could be that street-level bureaucrats, unlike top administrators, rarely deal directly
with elected political superiors, which inﬂuences the way they interpret hierarchical loy-
alty. Since they also have the strongest loyalty to clients they have day-to-day contact with,
we can hypothesize that, in general, the higher the frequency of contact with speciﬁc stake-
holders, the stronger the loyalties towards them.
Are the loyalty conceptions of top Dutch administrators different from other Western-
style democracies? And does the form of government inﬂuence the loyalties of top admin-
istrators? As argued previously, context is relevant (Aberbach et al. 1981). Yet, it can be
hypothesized that the nature of the work of top administrators in Western-style countries is
similar to such an extent that the differences between the loyalty conceptions of Dutch top
administrators (as presented here), and, say, American top administrators are smaller than
those between Dutch top administrators and Dutch municipal license providers. Based on
the hypotheses on the differences between the Dutch groups and the international compar-
ative literature on political-administrative relations, we could furthermore hypothesize that
contextual factors of inﬂuence on international differences between loyalty conceptions of
top administrators include the degree of intertwinement between political and administra-
tive elite and the recruitment of top administrators (e.g., Aberbach et al. 1981; Lee and
Raadschelders 2008). Lee and Raadschelders (2008, 243): ‘‘In terms of recruitment for
top bureaucratic positions, national differences have been found. The United States appears
to emphasize loyalty and political responsiveness to the government in power; the British
model stresses expertise of top-ranking civil servants, while the German model combines
loyalty and expertise.’’ Combining this with the differences between the groups in the Neth-
erlands, we can expect hierarchical loyalty to be more important in the United States and
professional loyalty to be more important in the United Kingdom. Also, we can expect the
strong involvement of the Dutch civil service in the production of policy advice and
limited use of political advisers (Brans et al. 2006, 58) to inﬂuence loyalty conceptions
in the Netherlands.
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Because of the aforementioned connection between the ambiguous concepts of loyalty
and accountability, a comparative study could add to the literature on different account-
ability notions within and between Western-style democracies (e.g., Bovens et al. 2008).
The classical model leaves no room for individual accountability.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Although all administrators see their elected ministers as important objects of loyalty, no
type adheres toWeber’s ideal of unquestioned obedience and loyalty.We found differences
in how modern top public administrators weigh their loyalty to the minister vis-a`-vis other
loyalty objects; four different loyalty conceptions were identiﬁed. By-the-Book Professio-
nals (conception A) want ﬁrst to serve society and its citizens. They generally use thin
moral reasoning and are more loyal to their own profession and professional rules than
the other top administrators. Like them, Society’s Neutral Servants (conception B) feel
a strong loyalty to society in general and public values. Unlike conception A, however,
they believe they can best serve society by being as neutral as possible and by giving little
weight to their own opinions and convictions; of all types, they are the most loyal to their
minister and have the fewest conﬂicts with them. The Personally Grounded (conception C)
generally employs thick moral arguments. More than any others, their loyalty lies most with
their private lives and individual consciences. They weigh their loyalties against those dic-
tated by other societal roles, sometimes leading to loyalty conﬂicts. They dislike rules be-
cause they impede their creativity. In contrast, the loyalty of the Open and Principled
Independents (conception D) lies largely with their own principles, the law, and ofﬁcial
rules. More than any other administrators, they employ thin guidelines and principles.
The high correlation between the factors ranged from .42 to .63, which usually indi-
cates an underlying consensus among respondents. In our case, it meant that the top admin-
istrators did not view their loyalty conceptions completely differently; the four factors can
be seen as variations on a common theme. To help with pinpointing where the theme lies,
a second-order factor analysis was performed on the four Q-sorts.
The underlying theme is that all administrators subscribe to the notion of being loyal to
their ministers (the hierarchical object of loyalty), as was concluded earlier by ’t Hart and
Wille (2006). The second-order analysis revealed that another object of loyalty is also im-
portant to all administrators: in the underlying consensual factor, statements concerning
society as the object of loyalty were most important (statements #7 and #13). Most top
administrators stress the importance of the public interest (as opposed to their own political
values) and that they work for the government because they want to serve society. This
indicates a strong Public Service Motivation (PSM) among top Dutch public administrators
(Perry 1996).
Several statements were ordered very similarly by the administrators (contributing to
the rather high correlations). For example, all four types rejected the view that efﬁciency is
more important than impartiality and fairness (see statement #4 and its associated factor
scores in the Appendix). Whatever the inﬂuence on Dutch civil service, these traditional
public values remain central, even at the cost of efﬁciency: —Effectiveness is of course
important, but it’s not what government is about. —Government is not a company. There
are demands like transparency and so on. Citizens should be able to trust government. That
means procedural justice and impartiality, including the bureaucracy that it sometimes
brings.
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Also notable is that none of the administrators felt a strong connection with other ABD
members; their loyalty is therefore not with their particular organization: —Does not in-
terest me. All the emails I get, I delete without reading. —They’re nice people, but I have
more to do with the top of the civil service. They happen to be ABD members, but only their
position is important to me. —I would function perfectly well without the ABD.
When we look at the objects of loyalty as earlier distinguished in table 2, it is clear that
hierarchical loyalty is the most important of all the loyalty conceptions. Loyalty conception
B has the highest loyalty to political superiors and conception D has arguably the lowest.
The second-order factor analysis revealed that society is also an important object of most
top administrators’ loyalty (indicating a strong PSM in this group). Also notable is that
loyalty to stakeholders in their policy ﬁeld (‘‘customer loyalty’’ in table 2) plays the small-
est role. Administrators’ loyalty to colleagues has an important role in their conceptions;
the other ﬁve objects of loyalty (hierarchical, personal, professional, societal, and legal) all
play a dominating role in at least one of the loyalty conceptions.
Based on a survey of its readers, the Dutch journal re.Public,11 recently claimed that
more than half of the respondents (presumably administrators) indicated that they were not
willing to work for a Partij voor de Vrijheid politician.12 This started a media discussion on
just where the loyalty of Dutch administrators in fact lies—the research question at hand
here. The question was answered by the four descriptions of loyalty conceptions of top
administrators. They described how top public administrators conceptualize their loyalties
and weigh objects of loyalties against each other. Administrators’ conceptualizations of
their loyalties are morally important: they indicate how administrators behave and make
decisions (cf. de Graaf 2003, 2005a; Fletcher 1993). Furthermore, different conceptions
mean different loyalty dilemmas and conﬂicts, which are in turn indicative of different
solutions.
APPENDIX
Table A1
Idealized Scores of the Factors of the 42 Statements
A B C D
1. In the end, my private life is more important than my
work.
1 0 3 22
2. When elected ofﬁcials ask something of me that is
against the law, and despite mywarnings they do not
listen to me, I will not do what they ask.
1 21 0 2
3. Committing to obligations towards colleagues can lead
to cronyism.
0 21 0 21
4. In my work, efﬁciency is more important than
impartiality and fairness.
23 22 22 23
5. In any mature democracy, top public administrators
should be allowed to say what they want to in
public. That’s simply freedom of speech.
21 23 21 3
Continued
10 May 8, 2009.
11 The Partij voor de Vrijheid is a new anti-Islamic party in the Netherlands headed by Geert Wilders.
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Table A1 (continued)
Idealized Scores of the Factors of the 42 Statements
A B C D
6. It is my main duty to mediate between conﬂicting
interests and to ﬁnd solutions everybody can live
with.
0 21 21 0
7. I work for the government because I want to serve
society.
3 3 1 1
8. I try to mitigate extreme resistance from societal
partners of our organization.
0 0 1 1
9. Sometimes elected ofﬁcials want something that is
practically impossible. What I notice in those cases
is that we as public administrators have a very hard
time saying ‘‘no.’’
0 0 0 0
10. In my work, I worry about the well being of less
privileged citizens
0 1 21 0
11. I ﬁnd it very important to know all the rules and
regulations and to stick to them.
0 22 23 22
12. The public administrator whose actions are
determined by party political considerations
undermines essential principles and procedures of
democracy.
1 2 2 1
13. In my work, I should apply public values over my
own political values.
2 3 1 1
14. How I look at things in my work is partly determined
by the people who surround me in my private life;
a discussion with friends can inﬂuence my judgment.
21 0 1 1
15. I have my own opinions on the morality of my actions
when at work – I cannot leave that up to my political
superiors.
1 0 0 21
16. Even without religious or philosophical motives,
administrators should be allowed to refuse a task if
their conscience dictates so.
0 0 0 21
17. Public administrators should be accountable to
criminal law for their public actions, even when
doing exactly what their political superiors expect
or want them to do.
22 21 22 21
18. It is my main duty to do what management expects
me to.
21 22 21 22
19. The most important features of good public
administrators are that they are loyal to their
organization and discreet in the outside world.
1 0 0 0
20. A public administrator works in public service. The
political ofﬁcial should be his/her ﬁrst client, but
public administrators should decide for themselves
what they think the best option is.
21 21 21 22
21. I know what is legal, not what is right. I stick to what
is legal.
22 21 21 21
22. Good public administrators focus on societal effects.
Bad public administrators focus on bureaucratic
output.
2 2 0 1
Continued
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Table A1 (continued)
Idealized Scores of the Factors of the 42 Statements
A B C D
23. Even when my personal convictions about the public
good are at odds with instructions of the elected
ofﬁcial, I should follow his or her instructions.
1 1 1 0
24. I feel like a public administrator 24 hours a day. 21 1 22 21
25. I should be able to live with myself, which is why
being loyal to my own conscience is the most
important thing for me.
1 0 2 1
26. Loyalty to my minister can be less important than
serving the public interest.
21 0 1 0
27. Acting with integrity means for public administrators
that they act according to their conscience.
1 21 21 0
28. Public administrators who are strongly focused on
their own careers don’t necessarily want the best for
their colleagues.
0 1 0 0
29. Punishable or reprehensible conduct in your private
life can sometimes be at odds with your duty to
behave as a good public administrator.
2 1 1 1
30. Sometimes you have to bend the rules a little when
dealing with societal partners of the organization.
23 0 1 21
31. When I disagree with a policy, I simply tell the
concerned parties of our organization.
21 22 23 23
32. I believe that professionalism and loyalty to
professional rules are the leading values in mywork.
3 0 2 2
33. I will not easily betray my colleagues, even when it
would bring me into deep trouble.
21 0 0 21
34. When I ﬁnd an assignment irresponsible, loyalty to
my own conscience and identity is the deciding factor.
2 1 3 2
35. I feel a stronger connection with government in
general than with my own ministry.
0 2 21 0
36. A top public administrator should always be careful
not to express him- or herself publicly if the minister
dislikes such behavior.
1 1 0 0
37. The rules that I have to follow in dealing with
stakeholders lower my efﬁciency and effectiveness.
22 21 21 0
38. As a top public administrator, I feel strongly
connected to other ABD members.
22 21 22 21
39. The disqualiﬁcation of any educated opinion –
including public administrators – cannot be
tolerated in a modern democracy.
0 23 1 1
40. Political ofﬁcials often have an interest in the short
term only, which leads to ad-hoc decision making. It
is the task of public administrators to also look at the
long run.
0 2 2 2
41. Public administrators should not base their decisions
on personal values because in such a case citizens
can no longer trust that policies and rules are
followed uniformly.
21 1 0 3
42. Good personal relations with my superiors will make
me more committed to my work.
0 1 0 0
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